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Abstract 
The main subject of this paper is to explain and investigate the results and structure of the competition 
between two networks. The article proceeds in the following manner. First, it briefly reviews the 
literature regarding alignment, new economy, network externality and networks. Second we set up a 
simple model to explain competition between two networks. As a result of this competition one of the 
networks can be winner. But in new economy “winner takes all” rule works. If the winner network 
reaches to critical mass, the value of his/her good increases for customers. Because of lock-in effects, 
network competition can be finished by monopoly or dominant network. In other words network 
competition promotes monopoly. This result is convenient with previous academic studies.
Keywords: Network, New Economy; Network Externality; Critical mass; Lock-in effect 
1.Introduction 
After the invention and diffusion of internet, we are witnessing great transformations in economic and
business structures. One of these great revolutions is realized in markets. Today classical Micro economic 
theory is insufficient to explain the dynamics of markets. One of the important differences between 
classical theory and today’s reality is networks. Some markets consist of at least one network in modern 
economies. These networks are competing to be a standard in markets. The aim of this study is to 
investigate the competition between networks. To this end, we followed this way. First, we briefly review 
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the literature regarding networks, network competitions and network externalities. Second we build a 
model that explains the market consist of at least two networks, we mean oligopoly market. Third we 
explained how firms compete with each other by looking through near historical competitions. Classical
wisdom states that network competition can be resulted by a monopoly market. Finally, we provide 
findings of our model and discuss in what conditions the network competition can be ended through 
monopoly market. 
2.Literature Review 
Internet and information technology has changed many things including markets and economy 
dynamics, in our daily life. Cass called the period after the diffusion of Internet as a fifth fluctuation that 
changes all of the economic life and the nature of business (Rubin,2001,p.1; Çinko,2003,p.158). 
Improvements in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) are thought to be the reason of the 
new economic situation. Today economics, markets, competition can not be explained by classical micro 
economic theory that is built by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean Babtiste Say etc in the late 1700’s and 
1800’s. Probably one of the most important differences between today’s economy and classical theory is
the presence of networks (Söylemez,2001,p.27).s Therefore Castells (2006,p.6) used “Network society” 
to determine new social environment. Also one of the terms that are used to determine today’s economy 
is network economy (Özgüler,2003,p.2). Networks are not entirely new term, but there has been a rapid 
increase in their number, transformation in their complexity. Economic studies about networks were 
started after 1980’s (Katz and Shapiro,1985; Farrell and Saloner,1986). Kelly (1998,p.26) told that in a 
new economy, value is created and shared by all members of a network rather than by individual 
companies or customers. 
Nowadays not only most of the firms are competing with cooperation each other, but also networks are 
competing too. The companies such as Wal-Mart, Dell etc. are defined as a part of network 
(øúler,2008,p.288). Also we are witnessing that some companies are producing or launching network 
components that are compatible to products that are produced by other firms. In other words these 
companies are cooperatively moving and forming networks. The academic searches about networks were 
largely based on externalities. The main studies about network externalities were published in 1980’s 
(Katz and Shapiro,1985; Farrell and Saloner,1986). Networks exposed externalities to consumers and we 
call these externalities as consumption network externalities. In today’s economy, there are many 
products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number 
of other agents consuming the good. These are called as Positive Network Effects in economy. Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) studied network externalities, classified the reasons of these positive externalities, draw 
distinction between direct and indirect externalities. According to Liebowitz and Margolis (1994,p.134)  
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“Goods exhibit a network externality wherever the consumer enjoys benefits or 
suffers costs from changes in the size of an associated network, that is, changes in 
quantities demanded”  
Network externalities can provide direct or indirect sources (Katz and Shapiro, 1985,p.424). Some 
communication technologies such as Telephone, fax machines, the utility of consumers directly depend 
on the size of a network. For example if only one customer has telephone, then the value of telephone is 
nothing.  As using the number of telephone increases among the customers the value of it starts to 
increase. This is direct source of network externalities, but also there is indirect source of externalities. 
Consumers know that if the usage of product increases, then it will be easy to find spare parts and 
equipments that are adaptable to this product. 
There are many studies that searches about networks and it’s externalities on economic literature 
(Katz and Shapiro,1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Liebowitz and Margolis, 
1994; Kelly, 1998; Matutes and Regibeaue, 1988; Economides, 1989; Economides,1996; Farrell and 
Klemperer, 2006, Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Stoneman, 1987). Kraus (2008) concerned with 
making adjustments to capacity of a network. Polanski (2007) set up a model that searches the impact of 
an exogenous connection structure of the network on the prices of information good. 
3.Assumptions And Model 
We can construct a model that provides us to explain the dynamics of network and market structure. 
We start to our model with consumers and finish with firms. Today, the structures about the markets are 
more complex than before. Our models have two networks which are competing with each other. By 
supposing two networks, we simplified all of the market structure and with the help of this model, we can 
easily determine the relationship between networks and markets.  By constructing our model, we 
considered the network models, that was constructed before (Katz and Shapiro,1985; Economides,1989; 
Economides,1996; Bental and Spiegel,1995) and we benefit from histories lived in markets (Masanel and 
Yoffie,2007; Spinello, 2005; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; David,1985). These stories are about 
QWERTY keyboard, IBM PC standards, software market etc (Gallaugher and Wang, 2002). Also we 
discussed if network competition supports the formation of monopoly market. We will test in what 
conditions monopoly market forms.  
The assumptions of our model are below. 
1-) All of the consumers and agents are rational. They want to maximize their utility without spending too 
much. All consumers have identical tastes. Also they can change their network without any transaction 
cost. 
2-) There are two networks which we will call Network X and Network Y. Each network is commanded 
by a centre firm. But there are complementary firms, too. Choosing a network means choosing both main 
and complementary goods. For example; if consumer chose PC standard instead of Mac standard then 
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consumer would use PC compatible hardware and software. Both networks produce the goods with same 
characteristics. The quality of goods only depends on both the decisions of firms and the number of 
customers. Networks are not compatible with each other. 
3-) There are M consumers in the market. M is a positive integer. We suppose that M is big enough to 
create effective network. If one of the networks reach big enough market share, the network will be 
attractive to participate for consumers. Therefore, the network size and market share are not used in 
different manner. The participants of the Network X is Mx and the participants of Network Y is My. Of 
course each consumer has different tastes, but to facilitate our computations we assumed that each 
consumer has same tastes and every consumer is identical. 
Mx + My = M                    (1) 
We concentrated on the competition between two centre firms and ignore the actions of complementary 
firms. Both of two centre firms want to get large share of market and get maximum income because they 
are rational agents. We can summarize the structure of our model by figure 1. 
4-) We ignore the negative consumption network effects. Liebowitz and Margolis (1994,p.134) 
mentioned about the negative network effects. For example; telephone or computer network can be 
overloaded, so the effect will be negative on individual consumer. We mean that consumers can suffer 
from the last participant of network. Economic literature generally mentions about three sources of 
network externalities. First source is directly related by the connection number. If a new customer 
participates to a network, the other participants in network can make more connection than before. 
Secondly consumers, who prefer the network with largest installed base, can find complementary goods 
easily. For example; if customer purchases IBM PC type instead of MAC, he can find compatible 
software easily. Third consumers can reach post purchase services easily if they chose the network with 
largest installed base (Katz and Shapiro,1985,p.424-425) 
 Figure 1. The Structure of the Market 
                                                Market 
                      Network X               Network Y 
Complementary Firms Complementary Firms 
Centre Firms Centre Firms 
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As it is seen in the Figure 1, Network X and Network Y are competing in a market. Both Networks 
have centre firms and complementary firms. Centre firms are institutions which set up the rules and 
standards of networks. Complementary firms are producing goods that can be used by the goods which 
are produced by centre firms. For example; Microsoft and øNTEL are setting up the rules of IBM PC type 
computers and other software and hardware firms are producing goods compatible to the products of 
øNTEL and Microsoft (Windows operating system). Therefore Microsoft and øNTEL are Centre firms of 
networks, also other hardware and software firms are complementary firms. Today WINTEL is one of the 
classical network examples.  
4.Competition Between Network X And Network Y 
Consumption network externalities are valid when the number of consumers, who purchase this good, is 
an important quality characteristic of that good, which affects the utility of consumers either directly or 
indirectly. According to previous academic studies quality is a variable that is under the full control of the 
producer. If the firm wants to increase the quality of a good, he will use high quality raw materials,
qualified employees. So it can be set independently of consumers' behavior (Bental and 
Spiegel,1995;197). Because of the network externalities, a producer can not fully control important 
quality characteristics of the product. He has to consider about the number of consumers. In network 
markets one of the variable, that affects quality of a good, is the installed base of network. The value of a 
network good is shown by Gallaugher and Wang (2002,p.305) (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Typical Theoretical Model For Network Goods 
By using Gallaugher and Wang (2002), we can define quality function of a consumer mathematically 
by (2). The utility function of consumer consists of two parts. First part is own utility of a good and 
second part is the utility that is the result of the number of consumers. In this definition q denotes the 
quality of the good which is under the control of producers. As the market share increases, the quality of 
the good increases, too.  
                                                                   ),( xux MqfQ =                                                                                       
Network value  
B(n)
Stand Alone 
Value A
Value of the 
network good 
B( )
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),( yuy MqfQ =             (2) 
Producer can choose to produce a good with high quality and to realize this, it can use high quality raw 
materials and high qualified employees in production. But also the firm must encourage consumers to join 
a network in order to make the network more attractive. However, consumers have different incomes, and
this is the starting point of the firm. The firm has two different choices now. First, the firm can only 
charge the price that the poorest consumer who joins a network is willing to pay. But if the production 
costs are high, it will not be possible to charge such a low price. Also richer consumers can think that the 
quality of a product is low. Second, the firm can exclude the poorest consumers from the network by 
charging high prices, but this time the willingness of the richer participants to pay is reduced on this 
account. Shortly, the firm has to find a way to lump rich and poor consumers together, because richer 
consumers are willing to pay more for a larger network (Bental and Spiegel,1995,p.198-199). We will 
show the effects of firms’ strategies later. 
The utility of a consumer depends on the quality and quantity of a good bundle. We don’t ignore the 
quality of a good (or good bundle as we used in our model) like classical microeconomics. We can show 
the utility function of consumer. The consumption quantity is shown with Q. Decreasing marginal utility 
is valid, but we will not consider about it anymore. The utility function of a consumer by participating 
Network X is shown in (3) and Network Y is shown in (4). These functions are simple forms of utility 
function in Lambertini and Orsini’s study (2001,p.971). Their function is shown with U = max{0q + ax -
p, 0}. As it is seen they used prices (p) in utility function. 
),,()),,(( QMqfQMqQfU xxuxx ==                  (3) 
),,()),,(( QMqfQMqQfU yyuyy ==                  (4)  
Rational consumer, who wants to maximize his/her utility, will benchmark utility functions and make 
decisions about consumption. If 
yx UU ≥                          (5) 
Then consumer will decide to participate Network X. Else or in other words  
xy UU ≥                                (6) 
Then consumer will decide to participate Network Y. The decision problem of consumer is given in (8). 
Income of a consumer is stable and we show it with Yc.  
{ }yx UU ,max                                  (7) 
                                                                    Y=Yc  
Seyﬁ  Top and Serkan Dilek / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 24 (2011) 1585–1595 1591
So how does the centre firm act to affect the decision of a consumer? Of course also the reactions of 
complementary firms affect consumers’ decisions, too. But their affection power is too low according to 
centre firms. As we mentioned before, we ignore the competitive actions of complementary firms. 
Economides (1989,p.1166) showed that equilibrium prices and profits are higher under compatibility. So, 
participating a network relates to desirable solutions for firms. 
The utility of some products for consumers increases with the number of other agents consuming the 
good. This term is called positive consumption externalities and there are several possible sources. First 
positive consumption externalities can be generated through a direct physical effect of buyers. Generally 
in communication technologies, the last consumer, who participate network, will increase possible 
connections of all other users. For example if one consumer is added to telephone network, all others can 
connect with him by using telephone. So the increase in the number of consumers, affect the utility of
others. Second consumer can reach complementary goods easily if the good is used widely in a market. 
For instance, consumer knows that if he/she chooses VHS type video player, he/she can easily video 
cassettes easier than Beta type video player. Third the quality and availability of post purchase services 
for a good depend on experience and size of the service network. It is clear that the experience and size of 
the service network vary with the number of goods that have been sold (Katz and Shapiro,1985p.425).  
Generally, the decisions of two players, who evaluate the strategies of their rival by using probability 
calculations, are used as a strategy in micro economic theory (Eren,2002,p.4). What can centre firms do to 
compete with each other? How do they convince consumers? If they want to affect consumers, they 
should consider about the utility function of rational consumers. We recall (3) and (4). The utility 
function of consumers depends on production costs, market share and consumption quantity. If centre 
firms want to increase the size of network, they should adjust these variables. We concentrated on some 
strategies of centre firms.  
Raising quality of a good.: First centre firms can increase the quality of a good by using high quantity raw 
materials and qualified employees. Rational consumers are sensitive to quality of a good. They want to
maximize their utility and they can do this by selecting network with high quality good. Nowadays 
Research and Development activities provide production of higher quality goods.  However, if costs 
increase, firms must increase the prices, too. In Demand theory we know that if prices increase, demand 
quantity will decrease. Small installed base that can be produced from high prices, has negative effect on 
consumer utility function. In addition, quality of a good does not only depends on costs but also on the 
size of network. For example; many authors decided that Beta type video players are more useful and 
have higher quality than the VHS type video players. But VHS type video players become standard in 
market and win the competition against Beta type video players. 
Pricing: Lower pricing is colliding with the first one. Rational consumers are also sensitive to price of a 
good. They want to maximize their utility with lower costs. To reach more demand, centre firms can 
charge lower price to enlarge the size of network. But firms, who want to increase quality of a good, have 
to charge high prices. So these strategies are colliding with each other. Larger size networks remind the 
term “critical mass”. Network effects become significant after a certain subscription percentage has been 
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achieved, called critical mass. Economides and Himmelberg (1995,p.5) defined critical mass as the 
smallest network size which can be sustained in equilibrium. At the critical mass point, the value obtained 
from the good or service is greater than or equal to the price paid for the good or service. So if centre 
firms become successful to reach critical mass, they can benefit from positive network externalities. 
Potential customers will prefer the larger size network and in a short time market can become monopoly. 
Software products can be classified as digital or information goods with a corresponding theoretical 
marginal cost of zero. Because of this character software markets witnessed different stories in the world. 
For example; summary of browser competition is given in Chiaravutthi (2006) and CD industry 
competition is given in Basu and others (2003,p.212). As a result the concept of critical mass formalizes 
the "chicken and the egg" paradox: generally rational consumers are not interested in buying the good 
because the installed base is too small and the installed base is too small because an insufficiently small 
number of consumers have bought the good. 
Lower pricing can encourage consumers to purchase more good. Rational consumers will decide on 
consumption quantity by considering decreasing marginal utility, their income and prices. Until their 
marginal utility-price ratio becomes equal to other good’s ratio, consumer will go on purchasing this 
good. But in network economies, something is different. The willingness to pay for the last unit may 
increase with the number of units sold (Economides and Himmelber;1995,p.4). In other words, customers 
in a network decide to buy more good. Therefore centre firms can reach critical mass quickly and the 
same result can be reached by second one.  
Raising Both Quality and Pricing: The most desirable act for firm is to apply both raising quality and 
lower pricing. It is not easy for firms, but they pay too much for Research and Development (R&D) 
activities to realize this. As a result of R&D activities, firms can improve their good and raise the quality 
of their good without any cost. In new economy generally the cost of first product is higher, but after first 
production, marginal costs are lower (Söylemez;2001,p.24). For example; a software firm can improve 
his/her good by paying much for R&D activities. But after this high cost, the firm will pay only for CD to 
increase production. If firm become successful to raise quality of a good with lower costs, He/she can
charge lower prices.  
5.Promoting Monopoly 
Lower prices and high quality will encourage consumers to buy the good of centre firm. Economic 
literature concerned about the importance of R&D activities for firms. Lim and others (2004) studied 
about technological competition in network economies and they argued that network features will 
increase R&D investments. Assume that centre firm of network X become successful to improve his/her 
product with lower costs, while centre firm of network y was not successful. So, the utility function of a 
consumer by participating Network X will change. (3) Equation will become like (8). Now new utility 
function (Ux1) is bigger than the old utility function (Ux). 
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),,()),,((1 QMqqfQMqqQfU xxuxx Δ+=Δ+=               (8) 
                                        ),,()),,(( QMqfQMqQfU xxuxx ==
Utility of network X increases while utility of network Y decreases. The utility function of a consumer by 
participating Network X is bigger than Network Y.  
yx UU ≥1                         (9) 
So we will see two effects. First new participants, who are outside of the market, will come to Network X. 
Second, participants of Network Y will change their network and participate to Network X. Because of 
these movements, Network X can reach to critical mass. Therefore the utility function of a consumer by
participating network X will increase by the help of network externalities. It will be more difficult to deny 
Network X. Metcalfe, inventor of the ETHERNET Computer-Networking Technology, says that the 
value of a network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system 
(Villasis,2008;2). For example; two telephones can only make one connection, five telephones can make 
ten connections and twelve telephones can make 66 connections. If the number of connection is important 
part of good quality, quality will increase proportionally to the square of the number of users. The 
competition started to be against network Y and in favor of network X.  
Lock-in is an important result of critical mass. If one of the networks become dominant in a market 
and reach critical mass, his/her good can make lock-in effect in a market. Consumers can prefer the good, 
which is locked in, although rival good is cheaper and have higher quality. Classical Lock-in effect is 
realized in keyboard competition (David, 1985). Although F type keyboard is more useful and faster, 
because of lock-in effect most of the consumers can prefer to purchase QWERTY keyboard. 
Kim (2002,p.398) thought that incumbent monopolists never has an incentive to invite entry if the 
goods are homogeneous. In other words for homogeneous goods firms wish to become monopoly. Albeit 
the centre firms will not have monopoly power, they can be a part of dominant network in this model. 
Shortly, positive network externalities promote monopolies. There are many examples of dominant 
networks that become after competition between networks (Spinello,2005; Economides and Himmelberg, 
1995; David,1985). 
6.Findings and Conclusions 
Networks have been in the centre of economic literature since 1980’s. Also economic history 
witnessed interesting network competitions (Karnik,2000; David,1985). We explained the competition of 
two networks by using simple algebra. Conventional economic wisdom claimed that network externalities 
promote the formation of monopoly markets in short run. Of course, in the long run new firms can launch 
new products that can create new platforms, in other word new entries threaten monopolies 
(Tirole,1992,p.392). In the competition of two networks, if centre firm of one network become successful 
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to convince most of the customers, incumbent network can win this competition. As number of the 
customer of the firm in the market increases, the value of the product for consumer increases. This is just 
the solution of positive network externality. If there is not capacity problem, network externality will 
promote the formation of monopolies. Critical mass is important term that supports incumbent network. If 
installed base of a network reaches critical mass, customers can be attracted from this base and decide to 
purchase goods of incumbent network. These network goods create lock-in effect in a market. Customers 
can not easily return to other network’s good. Shortly network externalities, lock-in effect, critical mass 
promote the monopolies. Further studies should be done to illuminate the background and results of 
network competition in Turkey. 
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